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Snakes, Skins and the Sphinx: Nietzsche's Ecdysis

Oxford Brookes University, Harcourt Hill Campus, Oxford OX2 9AT, UK ttyler{at}brookes.ac.uk

Foucault claimed that Nietzsche's philosophy constitutes la grande rupture from Kant's conception of knowledge. The break occurred, however, only after Nietzsche had shed his own Kantian skin. This article examines both the debt that early Nietzsche owes to Kant, and the nature of the break evident in his later work. It highlights three key facets of the mature Nietzsche's epistemology: (1) there is no disinterested truth, only a range of evaluative perspectives; (2) these perspectives must continually change and multiply; and (3) the subject of any perspective need not be human. As Nietzsche's own eyesight deteriorated, he saw more, and he saw more clearly.

Key Words: animal • ecdysis • eye • Foucault • Kant • Nietzsche • Oedipus • perspectivism • skin • snake • Sphinx • thing-in-itself

Journal of Visual Culture, Vol. 5, No. 3, 365-385 (2006)
DOI: 10.1177/1470412906062284


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